

Pragmatics in Indirect Speech Acts

Kim Kyong Hak

Dept. of English Language and Literature

(Received December 30, 1981)

〈Abstract〉

Gazder (1979) defines the domain of pragmatics as follows: Pragmatic=Meaning-Truth Condition. Pragmatics is then equated with those aspects of meaning that are arrived at by general principles of preferred interpretation. In this paper, our main concern is to examine those general principles about indirect speech acts, to formulate them more or less rigorously and then to apply them to the actual conversational situation. In chapter II, we may discuss Grice's Maxim and Cooperative principle and then the two alternative proposals of indirect speech acts, proposed by Lakoff and Searle respectively. In chapter III, we may assume that there need to be at least three kinds of convention in indirect speech acts inspite of their fuzzy concept; namely conventional implicature, generalized conversational implicature and particularized conversational implicature. We may define their potential function and then we may argue for the projection principle, together with the function of potential implicature.

간접언어 행위에 대한 회용론적 접근

김 경 학

영 어 영 문 학 과

(1981.12.30 접수)

〈국문요약〉

Gazdar (1979)는 회용론(Pragmatics)의 영역을 문장의 의미에서 그 문장의 논리적 진리치를 논하는 영역을 제외한 분야라고 정의하고 있다. 이는 의미론의 영역을 문장의 논리적 진위관계를 논하는 영역으로 제한하고, 회용론에서는 문장의 의미를 해석해 나가는 과정에서, 여기까지 문맥에 따라 해석해 나가는데 필요한 여러원칙을 다룬다는 의미가 된다.

본 논문에서는, 특히 간접언어행위(Indirect Speech act)에서 볼 수 있는 여러 일반원칙들을 살펴, 이를 어드징도 공식화 하여, 실제 대화상의 원칙으로 적용할 수 있음을 밝히는데 주력하고 있다.

먼저 제2장에서는 Grice (1975)의 공리(Maxim)와 협동원칙(Cooperative Principle)을 살펴, 이를 근거로 한, 두가지 세안인 Lakoff (1975)와 Searle (1975)의 입장을 살펴, 상당점을 논하고 필요한 원칙을 찾아 수정, 보완 하였다.

제3장에서는 2장에서 검토한 것과 Cole (1975)과 Morgan (1978)의 비판을 토대로 간접언어행위에는 기어도 세가지 유형의 함축에 대한 약정(Convention)이 있을 수 있음을 밝혔다. 즉 익징저 함축(Conventional Implicature), 보편저 대화함축(Generalized Conversational Implicature), 그리고 개별저 대화함축(Particularized Conversational Implicature)으로써, 다른 일반함축보다는 개별화 된 개념으로 간접언어행위에서 이끌어 낼 수 있는 언중행위소(illocutionary force)에 대한 함축으로 정의 하았으며, Gazdar

(1979)처럼 잠재적 함축(Potential Implicature)으로 가정하여, 그 기능을 공식으로 정의하였다. 한편 이 공식에 의해 나온 잠재적 언중행위소가 문맥에 투사되기 위해서는 일관원칙(Consistency principle)이라는 일반원칙이 필요하며, 그 기능을 공식으로 정의 하였다. 또 이 원칙이 따라 김택문이다, 투사 필제의 여지가 있을 수 있지만, 그 다당성을 검토 하였다.

I. Introduction

Although a lot of linguists are now using the term "pragmatics", there is no unified definition of it. However, there are some remarkable definitions. Gazdar (1979) defines the domain of pragmatics as follows: Pragmatic=Meaning-Truth Condition. That is, its topic is those aspects of meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentences uttered. Pragmatics is then equated with those aspects of meaning that are arrived at by general principles of preferred interpretation.

Kempson (1975) also regards pragmatic theories as performance theories. Morgan (1978), discussing pragmatics and linguistic, notes that the conversational pragmatics is the application of general principle of interpreting acts, applied to the subcase of communicative acts and more particularly, verbal communicative acts. It means to include the general principles about context, usage, and speaker's and hearer's attitude or intention, which are all non-rigid concept. Therefore our task, as far as possible, is to formulate those general principles.

In this paper, our main concern is to examine those general principles about indirect speech acts, to formulate them more or less rigorously and then to apply them to the actual conversational situation. In chapter II, we may discuss Grice's Maxim and Cooperative principle which is most important and relevant to the notion of implicature. Then the two alternative proposals of indirect speech acts, proposed by Lakoff and Searle respectively, will be

discussed and their main principles and generalization will be examined. In discussing, we may argue against Lakoff's logical entailment and for the need of pragmatic principles.

In chapter III, the convention frequently used in indirect speech acts will be examined. Then we may assume that there need to be at least three kinds of convention in indirect speech acts inspite of their fuzzy concept; namely conventional implicature, generalized conversational implicature and particularized conversational implicature, which are all independently used terms in other pragmatic areas. According to their definition, their formal properties and functions may be assumed and examined by examples. With the aid of formal apparatus from Gazdar (1979), we may define their potential function and then apply them to the projection problems. In discussing the projection problems, we may argue for the projection principle, namely consistency principle, together with the function of potential implicature.

II. Two Alternative Proposals

1. Grice's Maxim and Cooperative Principle

In order to communicate accurately and efficiently speakers and listeners try to cooperate with one another. They cooperate, for example, on the simple mechanics of speech. Speakers talk in audible voices, use languages they believe their listeners know, and adhere to the phonology, syntax, and semantics of those languages. Just as important, however, are the conventions speakers and listeners observe in what is said how it is expressed. Put concisely, speakers try to be informative, truth-

ful, relevant, and clear, and listeners interpret what they say on the assumption that they are trying to live up to these ideals. Grice (1975) formulates roughly following cooperative principle which participants in conversation will be expected to observe.

- (1) Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

In observing the cooperative principle, according to Grice, speakers normally try to satisfy four maxims: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner.

The Maxim of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and can be stated like follows:

- (2) Quantity

- a. Make your contribution as informative as is required. (for the current purposes of the exchange)
- b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The Maxim of Quality includes a supermaxim and two more specific maxims like follows:

- (3) Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
 - a. Do not say what you believe to be false.
 - b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

- (4) Relevance: Be relevant

Finally, the maxim of Manner, relating not to what is said but, rather, to how what is said is to be said, includes a supermaxim and four more specific maxims like follows:

- (5) Manner: Be Perspicuous.

- a. Avoid obscurity of expression
- b. Avoid ambiguity
- c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
- d. Be orderly

These maxims are more than a code of con-

versational etiquette. They are critical to the very meaning of what the speaker said. Consider the following exchange.

(6) A: I am out of gas

B: There is a gas station around the corner

On the surface, speaker B has merely asserted the presence of a gas station nearby. But by implication he has conveyed something more. He expects speaker A to realize he has adhered to the maxim of relation and so his contribution is relevant to what A had just said. And if A takes it to be relevant, A will see that B means that the station is probably open and sells gas. This is an instance of what Grice called conversational implicature. Although B hasn't said directly that the gas station is open and sells gas, he has "implicated" it. If A is to utilize B's utterance as B intended A to, A must construct this implicature as part of what B meant to convey.

Grice (1975) noted that speakers can also bring about conversational implicatures by flouting one of the maxims—consider the example like (7), when the speaker tells her boyfriend while knowing that he knows she thinks it was a terrible play.

(7) That was certainly a terrific play we saw tonight.

In saying this, speaker is flouting the maxim of quality—she is obviously not being truthful. But she expects her boyfriend to see that, and that she is still adhering to the cooperative principle, so by implication she means her comment to be taken as sarcasm, as meaning the opposite of what she said, Understatement irony, and metaphor work in much the same way.

Listeners, then, must always ask themselves implicitly "Why did the speaker say what he said?" Knowing that the speaker is adhering to the cooperative principle, with its maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner,

they can usually see why quite accurately. Yet nothing has been said so far about how they see. What is the process by which listeners construct the implicatures they were meant to see. One area where this question has been studied is in the comprehension and utilization of indirect speech acts, especially indirect requests.

When a duke says to his servant "It's hot in here, Charles," the servant realizes that the duke has asserted that it is hot in the room. But the servant reasons further: "Why did the duke assert that here, now, under these circumstances? Being hot is uncomfortable, and since my job is to attend to his comforts, he must be asking me to make it less hot in the room by opening the window." The duke's direct speech act is an assertion. That is its literal meaning. Yet by uttering this assertion he has also performed an indirect speech act, a request to open the window. That is its indirect meaning. In Grice's terms, the duke has implicated, by the maxim of relation, that he is requesting the servant to open the window, and the servant has understood it as such. The duke could have accomplished the same thing by asking "Does the window need to stay closed?" As a question, it would elicit the answer No, but it would also be taken as a request to open the window. In such cases listeners utilize both the direct and the indirect meanings, even though their ultimate interest is in the indirect meaning.

2. Performative Hypothesis and Conversational Postulate


Lakoff(1972) proposes the following logical form like (8) for all performatives, including declaratives:

Lakoff(1972) also notes:

...there is considerable evidence to show that even statements should be represented in logical form by the presence of some performative verb with a mean-

ing like 'say' or 'state'. Thus, it is claimed that the logical forms of imperatives, questions, and statements should be represented as in (8). In (8), S_i represents the propositional content of the command, question, or statement." [Lakoff(1972 : 560)]

(8)



According to this Performative Hypothesis, Lakoff(1975 : 262) presents the following proposal.

- (9) a. Satisfaction in a model is defined for all performatives including the implicit declarative performative.
- b. Performative predicates have the same satisfaction conditions as nonperformative predicates.
- c. Pronouns I, you, here, now, etc. are not in logical structure, but are 'introduced' by rules of grammar as replacements for variables.
- d. Global transderivational correspondence grammars are assumed.
- e. Logical structures are taken to be universal.
- f. $\text{Index} = \{a, \text{partial assignments to predicates}\}$
- g. Only literal meaning is given by model-theoretical interpretations of logical structures. Conveyed meaning is given by model-theoretical interpretations of logical structures conversationally entailed by logical structures of sentences in given contexts. Not all literal meanings are conveyed.

He also suggests following context dependent entailment proposal concerning the indirect

speech act.

"The adoption of the performative analysis for implicit declaratives allows one to avoid having pronouns like "I", 'you', 'here', and 'now' in logical structure, and hence allows one to get rid of pragmatic coordinates for speaker, hearer, time and place of utterance. But what is more important, defining satisfaction in a model for all performatives as I propose allows one to define entailment for all performative cases in the same way as entailment is defined for all nonperformative cases, namely:

- (10) $X \cup \{P\}$ entails Q (where P and Q are logical structures and X is a finite set of logical structures) if and only if Q is satisfied in all models at all points of reference at which X and P Satisfied." [Lakoff(1975 : 263)]

According to this context-dependent entailment proposal like (10), conversational implicatures may turn out to be logical entailments of performative utterances in certain contexts. Consider the followings:

- (11) a. I want you to take out the garbage.
 b. Can you take out garbage?
 c. Would you be willing to out the garbage?
 d. Will you take out the garbage?

Each of these sentences can convey a request to take out the garbage. Gordon and Lakoff (1975 : 86) propose the following conversational postulates on the basis of sincerity conditions.

- (12) a. $SAY(a, b, WANT(a, Q))^* \rightarrow REQUEST(a, b, Q)$
 b. $ASK(a, b, CAN(b, Q))^* \rightarrow REQUEST(a, b, Q)$
 c. $ASK(a, b, WILLING(b, Q))^* \rightarrow REQUEST(a, b, Q)$
 d. $ASK(a, b, Q)^* \rightarrow REQUEST(a, b, Q)$
 where Q is of the form $FUT(DO(b, R))$ [b will do act R] (the asterisks will be discussed)

In this case, the conversationally implied meaning (the request) can be conveyed only if the literal meaning (the question) is not intended to be conveyed and if the hearer assumes that it is not. We will indicate this notationally by putting an asterisk after the illocutionary content:

- (13) $V_P(a, b, S)^* = V(a, b, S) \text{ AND-INTEND}(a, CONVEY(a, b, V_P(a, b, S))) \text{ AND ASSUME}(b, \text{-INTEND}(a, b, V_P(a, b, S)))$ where V_P is a performative predicate

Consider the followings:

- (14) a. I want you to shut the door.
 b. I believe it's time to go home.
 c. I intend to pay you back.

As in the case of requests, one can convey statements and promises by asserting the corresponding speaker-based sincerity conditions. Therefore Gordon and Lakoff(1975 : 89) propose the following set of postulate:

- (15) a. $SAY(a, b, WANT(a, Q))^* \rightarrow REQUEST(a, b, Q)$
 b. $SAY(a, b, BELIEVE(a, Q))^* \rightarrow SAY(a, b, Q)$
 c. $SAY(a, b, INTEND(a, Q))^* \rightarrow PROMISE(a, b, Q)$

Lakoff(1975) also suggests that implicatures are not 'loose' or informal inferences like follows:

"Given the performative analysis, implicatures should turn out to be a species of semantic entailment, providing one had an adequate natural logic and an adequate analysis of the relevant culture specific principles of social interaction. Grice's theory of conversational implicature is based on the 'cooperative principle', the idea that certain 'maxims' are to be followed in conversational situations in which the participants are cooperating." [Lakoff(1975 : 270)]

Therefore Lakoff (1975 : 270) restated Grice's Maxims like the following.

- (16) a. If x is cooperating with y , then x will do only what is relevant to the enterprise at hand, unless his actions make no difference to the enterprise. [MAXIM OF RELEVANCE]

so forth) may refer to stages in the derivation of a sentence from logical structure to surface structure. A rule of grammar, however, has no access to the conversational entailments of logical structure.

Compare (25) with (26), which is intended to represent the position taken by Gordon and Lakoff:

(26) A rule of grammar may refer to stages in the derivation of a sentence from logical structure to surface structure. It may also refer to the conversational entailments of logical structure.

3. Inference Strategy

Searle(1975) proposes following hypothesis against the hypostatization of conversational postulate or alternative deep structures.

"In indirect speech act, the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. To be more specific, the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts includes a theory of speech acts, certain general principles of cooperative conversation, and mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer, together with an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences. It is not necessary to assume the existence of any conversational postulates nor any concealed imperative forces or other ambiguities." [Searle(1975 : 61)]

consider the following:

(27) A: Let's go to the movies tonight.

B: I have to study for an exam.

The utterance of (27A) constitutes a proposal in virtue of its meaning in particular because of the meaning of Let's. The utterance of (27B) in the context just given would normally constitute a rejection of the proposal not in virtue of its meaning because it is simply a statement about speaker B, but by means of the inferential strategy together with the cooperative principle.

Note also, that the inference is probabilistic, because it does not necessary constitute a rejection of the proposal. Speaker B might have gone on to say:

(28) a. I have to study for an exam, but let's go to the movies anyhow.

b. I have to study for an exam, but I'll do it when we get home from the movies.

Searle(1975) presents the cases which have a genality of form. Note the following examples:

(29) a. Can you reach the salt

b. Can you pass the salt

c. You could be be a little more quiet

These sentences could quite standardly be used to make indirect requests which concern the hearer's ability to perform the action, which is the preparatory condition of request.

Note another examples:

(30) a. I would like you to go now.

b. I want you to do this for me, Henry.

c. I wish you wouldn't do that.

These sentences concern the speaker's wish or want that hearer will do an act, which is the sincerity condition of request.

Consider another examples:

(31) a. Will you quit making that awful racket?

b. Would you kindly get off my foot?

c. Won't you stop making that noise soon?

These sentences concern the hearer's doing an act, which is propositional content of request. All of the three kinds of examples concern the felicity condition on the request illocutionary acts, namely the preparatory condition, the sincerity condition, and the propositional content condition. Therefore we may assume that those sentences concerning the felicity condition of request can be inferred as having the indirect request illocutionary force.

Note another examples:

- (32) a. Would you be willing to write a letter of recommendation for me?
 b. Do you want to hand me that hammer over there on the table?
 c. Would you mind not making so much noise?
- (33) a. You ought to be more polite to your mother.
 b. You should leave immediately.
 c. Must you continue hammering that way?

Those sentences like (32) concern the hearer's desire or willingness to do an act and those like (33) concern the reasons for doing acts.⁽¹⁾ Since wanting to do something is a reason par excellence for doing it, both (32) and (33) can be stated as the sentences concerning reason for doing acts. Therefore we may assume that those sentences concerning the request reason for doing the act can be inferred as having the indirect request illocutionary force.

Note more complex case:

- (34) a. Would you mind awfully if I asked you if you could write me a letter of recommendation?
 b. Would it be too much if I suggested that you could possibly make a little less noise?

These sentences are very complex since most of its members are constructed by permitting certain of the elements of those mentioned conditions.

Except the complex embedding cases, Searle (1975: 72) proposes following four generalization by which the sentences in question have the generality of form.

- (35) a. *S* can make an indirect request by ei-

ther asking whether or stating that a preparatory condition concerning *H*'s-ability to do *A* obtains.

- b. *S* can make an indirect directive by either asking whether or stating that the propositional content condition obtains.
 c. *S* can make an indirect directive by stating that the sincerity condition obtains, but not by asking whether it obtains.
 d. *S* can make an indirect directive by either stating that or asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing *A*, except where the reason is that *H* wants, or wishes, etc., to do *A*, in which case he can only ask whether *H* wants, wishes, etc., to do *A*. (*S* means speaker, *H* means hearer, *A* means act)

Note the following:

- (36) a. I want you stop making that noise, please.
 b. Could you please lend me a dollar.

These sentences, including all of those mentioned sentences having generality of form, can take sentence adverb "please," either at the end of sentence, or preceding the verb. Searle (1975) suggests that these sentences can conventionally be used to issue request though they do not have an imperative force as part of their meaning. Searle also notes that those sentences are not idioms but idiomatic. Consider the followings:

- (37) a. Can you close the door?
 b. Are you able to close the door?

Though (37b) is idiomatic but does not have the same indirect request potential as (37a), which is both idiomatic and idiomatically used

(1) Searle (1975) also presents another examples which belong to this class but have no generality of form.
 a. You're standing on my foot.
 b. I can't see the movie screen while you have that hat on.
 Also, more complex sentences
 a. How many times have I told you (must I tell you) not to eat with your fingers?
 b. I must have told you a dozen times not to eat with your mouth open.
 c. If I have told you once, I have told you a thousand times not to wear your hat in the house.

as requests. Sadock(1974) note that his M-M (the meaning-meaning) hypothesis⁽²⁾ allows those sentences like (37a) to receive the semantic representation of question. Consider the followings:

- (38) a. Can you please close the window?
 b. *Are you able to please close the window?

The sentences like (38a) can conventionally be used as requests by providing a general principle (Searle's generalization like (35)) that requests can be gotten across by questioning the hearer based sincerity condition on request. But the same prediction would erroneously be made for the sentences like (38b) by parity of reasoning. The fact that apparently closely synonymous sentences can have radically different pragmatic values is an extremely grave problem for Lakoff⁽³⁾ and Searle. Therefore Searle (1975) suggests that besides the maxim proposed by Grice, there seems to be an additional maxim of conversation that could be expressed as follows:

- (39) Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to.

III. Pragmatic Aspects of Indirect Speech Act

1. Convention in indirect speech act.

Note the following examples:

- (40) a. Wash your hands before you eat your chicken.
 b. Let's wash our little handsy-wandies before we eat our chicki-chicky.
 c. Can you wash your hands before you eat your chicken.
 d. Are you able to wash your hands before you eat your chicken.

As we have seen in chapter II.2, Cole(1975) argues that the sentence like (40b) underlies the similar logical structure like (40a) because nonliteral let's sentences are not understood as involving an inference from the putative literal meaning to the meaning in context. The process that the conversational implicature of the literal let's construction have, by convention, been assimilated to the literal meaning of the lexical item is referred to the lexicalization of conversational meaning. This process would take place as a result of the frequent use of a construction to convey meanings not inherent in the logical structure of the sentences employing the construction. Cole (1975) argue that nonliteral let's is in the process of lexicalization and in addition, lexicalized nonliteral let's has lost the connotative properties

(2) Sadock(1974) refers Lakoff's approach to S.M. hypothesis since it operates the surface meaning of the sentence in question and the extreme view at the other pole, which Heringer (1972) advocate, to U.M hypothesis since it is the use of an utterance that corresponds to its encoded illocutionary force. Against S.M and U.M hypothesis, Sadock(1974) proposes the third position which agrees with the S.M position in some case and agrees with the U.M position in some. He refers the third position to M.M hypothesis, which is to provide a method for determining in which cases illocutionary force and gross surface form agree, and in which cases they do not.

(3) Gordon and Lakoff(1975) also note the distribution of adverb "please." Consider the following:

- (1) a. Please, can you open a window?
 b. Please, will you get me a glass of water?
 c. Please, it's cold in here.
 d. Please, my daughter's a virgin.
 e. Please, it's 10 O'clock.
 f. Please, be glad that they didn't fire you.
 g. Please, get me a drink.
 (2) a. *Can you open a window, please?
 b. *will you get me a glass of water, please?
 c. *It's cold in here, please.
 d. *My daughter's a virgin, please.
 e. *It's 10 O'clock, please.
 f. *Be glad that they didn't fire you, please.
 g. *Get me a drink, please.

They suggest that the distribution of the morpheme please is, in part, determined by context and conversational implicature.

associated with the conversational implicature necessary to relate literal let's sentences. The new, idiomatic meaning might at first be similar to the original literal meaning, but as time passed, it might become more and more disassociated from the original, literal import. Cole(1975) also suggests that the typical of the final phrase of lexicalization are phrases like (41b), which most speaker do not associate with its etymological meaning of (41a).

- (41) a. God be with you.
b. Good-bye

Morgan(1978) also notes that there are at least two distinct kinds of convention involved in speech acts: conventions of language, that jointly give rise to the literal meaning of sentence, and conventions of usage, that govern the use of sentence with their literal meaning for certain purposes. Consider the example:

- (42) a. Can you pass me the salt?
b. Are you able to pass me the salt?

The sentence like (42a) is simultaneously conventional and natural, while the sentence like (42b) conventional but not natural. Searle (1975) also notes that (42a) is idiomatic and conventionally used. This kinds of convention is regarded as conventions of usage in contrast of convention of the language. Morgan (1978) proposes that conventions of usage can be considered to contain three kinds of element; occasion, purpose, and means. As the statement of means become more specific and lexicalized, the convention approaches a convention of the language, which is a statement about literal meaning. As the connections between purpose and means become obscured, the relation between them is ripe for reinterpretation as a convention of the language. But the sentence (42b) is not conventionally used as a request though we can obtain the meaning of the indirect request in appropriate context.

(4) Sadock (1974) suggest that the sentences like (43) behave as idioms while those like (44) behave as metaphors. On the other hand, Searle (1975) suggests that the sentences like (43) are not idioms but idiomatic.

Consider the examples:

- (43) a. Will you close the door.
b. Will you please/kindly close the door.
c. Will you close the door, someone?
(44) a. When will you close the door?
b. *When will you please kindly close the door.
c. *When will you close the door, someone?

Both (43a) and (44a) can be used to get the addressee to close the door as an indirect speech act. Nevertheless, there is a fairly strongly different feeling as we have seen in chapter II, 3. That is, (43a) bluntly tells someone to close the door, while (44a) only hints at it.⁽⁴⁾ This intuitive feeling is confirmed by the difference of their formal properties as in (43) and (44) respectively.

Therefore, we may conclude that there is some degree of convention in indirect speech acts. Even if we cannot cut discretely the degree of convention, we may assume that there are at least three kinds of convention in indirect speech acts. That is, conventional implicature, generalized conversational implicature and particularized conversational implicature. The request illocutionary force in (40b) is considered to the conventional implicature since it has a lexicalized conversational implicature, that in (40c) considered to the generalized conversational implicature since it has a generality of form, and that in (40d) considered to the particularized conversational implicature since it depends on its particular conversational context.

All of these implicatures may be assumed to be the potential implicature as in Gazdar (1979):

"That is, they give all implicatures which the sentence could possibly have prior to contextual cancellation. I shall call these potential implicatures 'im-

implicatures. "...The implicature functions are defined as relations between SENTENCES and SETS OF SENTENCES." [Gazdar (1979: 55)]

We may define f_{cI} which, given a sentence ϕ as argument of an indirect speech act, will return a direct request illocutionary force like conventional implicature as its value;

$$(45) f_{cI}(\phi) = \{DR : DR \equiv I\}$$

Where 'DR' means direct request, 'I' means a set of illocutionary force and for all sentences ϕ such that it contains lexicalized item of conversational implicatures.

According to (45), (46) implicate a direct request illocutionary force.

(46) a. Now, let's all think before we raise our hands.

b. Why not stop here?⁽⁵⁾

We may define a function f_{cI} which, given a sentence ϕ as its argument of an indirect speech act, will return an indirect request illocutionary force like generalized conversational implicature as its value:

$$(47) f_{cI}(\phi) = \{IR : IR \equiv I\}$$

Where 'IR' means indirect request, 'I' means a set of illocutionary force and for all sentences ϕ such that it has a generality of form derived from Searle's (1975) four generalization as in (35)

According to (47), (48) implicate an indirect request illocutionary force.

(48) a. Can you pass me the salt?

b. I want you to do this for me.

c. Would you kindly get off my foot.

d. Why don't you be quiet?

We may define the function f_{PI} which,

given a sentence ϕ as its argument of an indirect speech act, will return an indirect request illocutionary force, like particularized conversational implicature as its value;

$$(49) f_{PI}(\phi) = \{IR : IR \equiv I\}$$

Where 'IR' means indirect request, 'I' means a set of illocutionary force and for, all sentences ϕ such that it contains neither lexicalized item of conversational implicature nor generality of form derived from (35).

According to (49), (50) implicate an indirect request illocutionary force.

(50) a. It's cold in here.

b. Are you able to close the window?

c. What's the reason that you don't close the window?

d. Are you opposed to closing the window?

2. Projection Problems in indirect Speech Acts.

We may assume that the potential implicature of an illocutionary force by the function of (45), (47) and (49) can be projected to the real one by means of consistency principles like follows:

(51) An illocutionary force I is consistent with a set of proposition X from the previously mentioned context or afterward uttered proposition in just case I is true in some possible world in which all the members of X are true.

According to (51), we may think of the case that potential implicatures can be suspended or cancelled if they are not consistent with a

(5) In order to explain (46b), Gordon and Lakoff (1975) propose the following transderivational constraint "WHY YOU TENSE $X \Rightarrow$ WHY X ONLY IF C

('Unless you have some good reason for doing X , you should not do X ')."

C indicates that the application of the rules is relative only to those contexts and conversational postulates such that they together with the logical structure of the sentence entail what is on the right-hand side of C

Searle (1975), also notes that it requires a voluntary verb and reflexive like follows:

a. *Why not re-embles your grandmother?

b. Why not wash yourself?

However Searle doesn't think its form proves to be imperative in meaning. But we may assume that the deletion of YOU+TENSE behaves as lexicalized item of conversational implicature.

set of proposition X from the previously mentioned context or afterward uttered proposition. Consider the following:

(52) Why not stop here?

(53) A: We ought to stop here.

B: Why not stop here?

(54) A: Why not stop here?

B: Well, there are several reasons for not stopping here, First,.....

The potential direct request illocutionary force in (52) by f_{cI} defined in (45) can be projected to the real one by the principle of (51) since we can find no inconsistency. On the other hands, the potential direct request illocutionary force in (53) and (54), which Searle (1975) suggests, may be cancelled because of their inconsistency with the previously mentioned context, and afterward uttered proposition respectively.⁽⁶⁾ Consider the following:

(55) A. Can you pass the salt?

B. Yes, I can, Here it is.

B': No, I can't, it's down there at the end of the table.

Though (55) keeps its literal meaning when responded positively or negatively, which is the evidence of conversational implicature rather than logical entailment, the potential indirect request illocutionary force can be projected to real one because there is no inconsistency in this situation. But we may imagine the case that the speaker really asks the hearer's ability.

Note the following:

(56) A. I can pass everything in this room.

B. Can you pass the salt?

The potential indirect request can be cancelled because it is inconsistent with the previous mentioned context. We can easily apply this consistency principle in the particularized conversational implicature as in (28)

So we may move to the next issue which concern the formal properties of generalized and particularized conversational implicatures. Consider the followings:

(57) a. Please, open the window.

b. Please, will you open the window?

c. Please, when will you open the window?

We may assume that when the speaker utters "please", its contextual situation is projected to the request. Therefore the indirect request illocutionary force by f_{cI} in (57b), and by f_{pI} in (57c) may be assumed to be projected to real one by the consistency principle because there is no inconsistency. But note the following examples which show the different formal properties;

(58) a. Will you please/kindly open the window?

b. *When will you please/kindly open the window?

(59) a. Will you open the window, someone?

b. *When are you going to open the window, someone?

In contrast with (57), the sentence-adverb please/kindly and indefinite vocative occurs in the middle of utterance and at the end of utterance in (58) and (59) respectively. The generalized conversational implicature constructions can allow these formal properties according to their definition because they have generality of from but particularized conversational implicature constructions cannot allow, since they aren't used conventionally and don't have generality of from. Therefore we may predict their acceptability in following ways. When (58b) and (59b) are uttered, they implicate both the indirect request and particularized conversational implicature. But they contain the generalized formal properties in the

(6) I'm not sure of these examples' acceptability because my intuition does not allow these example but rather the sentence like *Why don't you stop here?* in this case. Even if they are accepted since there is variance to decide the degree of convention shown in chapter III; 1, our terminological conventional implicatures can be cancelled because they are pragmatic.

process of uttering. Therefore they become contradictory and we can predict their unacceptability. On the other hand, there is no contradiction in (58a) and (59a), and we can predict their acceptability.

IV. Conclusion

We have discussed the various aspects of indirect speech acts. In most cases, their explanation depends on their context and their conventional degree. Therefore we may not explain these phenomena by means of logical entailment with together performative hypothesis. The Searle's informal implication and comment by means of inferential strategy is very convincing inspite of their informality and loose concept.

According to Cole (1975) and Morgan (1978), We may assume that there are at least three kinds of conventional degree in indirect speech acts, though their degree belongs to the fuzzy set; namely conventional implicature, generalized conversational implicature and particularized conversational implicature.

With the aid of formal apparatus of Gazdar (1979), we may formalize their implicature function and apply it to their projection problems in various cases. However it may require more rigid formulation, which will be provided by further research.

References

- Austin J.L (1962) How to do things with words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cole P. (1975) "The synchronic and diachronic status of conversational implicature." In Cole P. & J.L. Morgan (Eds.) (1975) Syntax and semantics 3.
- Cole, P. (Ed.) (1978) Syntax and semantics 9: Pragmatics. New York. Academic press.
- Cole, P. & J.L. Morgan (Eds.) (1975) Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts. New York. Academic Press.
- Davidson, D. & G. Harman (Eds.) (1972) Semantics of natural language. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Gazdar, G (1979) Pragmatics, New York: Academic Press, Inc.
- Gordon D and G. Lakoff (1975) "Conversational Postulates" in Cole and Morgan (Eds.) (1975) Syntax and Semantics 3.
- Grice, H.P. (1975) "Logic and conversation." In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.) Syntax and Semantics 3.
- Lakoff, G. (1972) "Linguistics and natural logic." In Davidson, D. & C. Harman (Eds.) (1972) Semantics of natural language. Dordrecht. Reidel.
- Lokoff, G. (1975) "Pragmatics in natural logic." In Keenan, E.L. (Ed.) (1975) Formal semantics of natural language.
- Morgan, J.L. (1978) "Two Types of Convention in Indirect Speech Acts" in Cole, P. (1978) Syntax and Semantics 9: pragmatics.
- Oh C-K and Dinneen D. A (Eds.) (1979) Syntax and Semantics 11. Presupposition, New York; Academic Press.
- Sadock, J.M. (1974) Toward a linguistic theory of speech acts. New York: Academic Press.
- Searle, J.R. (1969) Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J.R. (1975) "Indirect speech acts." In Cole, P. & J.L. Morgan (Eds.) (1975) Syntax and semantics 3: Speech Acts.