The impact of reciprocity on workers' support for universal basic income policy; Green Bonds and Corporate ESG Performance

Abstract

This dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter’s context is about the impact of reciprocity on workers' support for universal basic income policy. The second is to study the Green Bonds Improve Corporate ESG Performance using Chinese listed company data. The chapter 1 shows that how the reciprocity affects the negotiation of universal basic income (UBI) between poor and the work representatives. This chapter builds a normal form game between workers and the poor to investigate the impact of reciprocity on Universal Basic Income (UBI) policies. We find that under the rational economic man assumption, the two sides are unable to reach a consistent equilibrium on UBI policy that satisfies both sides. In contrast, reciprocity can lead workers and the poor to agree on UBI policy options. Second, if both sides are selfish, the result will be that social welfare is lower than it would be under a positive reciprocal equilibrium. And a negative reciprocal equilibrium is more destructive to social welfare than selfishness. Finally, to solve a consistent reciprocal equilibrium, we find the Reciprocal Equilibrium Condition (REC) of the two-player reciprocal normal form game, and when the condition is satisfied, we can always find a consistent reciprocal equilibrium. Chapter 2 uses data from Chinese listed companies and finds that the issuance of green bonds significantly improves corporate ESG performance. This effect is more significant in firms with younger managers or fewer financing constraints than the others. We also find that green bonds improve ESG performance by increasing financing size. Robustness is tested using multiple control variables and ologit method, and the findings are robust. The findings of we provide policymakers with an effective tool to help improve corporate ESG performance through green bonds.