경영자보상과 이익관여노력

Abstract

연간이익의 시계열속성으로 일반적으로 랜덤워크가 적절하다고 여겨지나 극심한 이익의 다음년도에는 일시적으로 평균회귀과정(mean-reverting process)이 발생한다. 이러한 평균 회귀현상은 극심한 이익에 포함된 일시적이익항목에 의한 효과 또는 극심한 이익에 포함된 자의적 발생의 이연효과로 설명되어 왔다. 본 연구는 평균회귀현상의 설명에 있어서 전년도의 이익성과에 따라 다를 수 있는 경영자의 이익관여동기(earnings intervention incentives)를 고려해야 함을 제시한다. 이러한 차별적 이익관여동기 가설은 경영자의 회계의사결정과 관련하여 능률적 또는 기회주의적 회계선택(efficient or opportunistic accounting choice)의 두 형태를 모두 포함하는 점에서 기존연구보다 보다 확장된 설명이라 할 수 있다.

Prior studies have shown the mean-reversion tendency of annual earnings following the year of extreme earnings. A typical explanation for the mean-reversion has been the existence of transitory earnings components included in the extreme earnings. This study explores the possibility of manager's asymmetric incentives to intervene in the reported earnings based on the relationship between earnings and the manager's compensation. The results show that managers have greater incentives to intervene in the reported earnings when prior earnings are low versus high. This implies the need to consider manager's different magnitude of incentives and efforts to intervene in the reported earnings, in explaining the mean-reversion of the extremely high versus low annual earnings.

Prior studies have shown the mean-reversion tendency of annual earnings following the year of extreme earnings. A typical explanation for the mean-reversion has been the existence of transitory earnings components included in the extreme earnings. This study explores the possibility of manager's asymmetric incentives to intervene in the reported earnings based on the relationship between earnings and the manager's compensation. The results show that managers have greater incentives to intervene in the reported earnings when prior earnings are low versus high. This implies the need to consider manager's different magnitude of incentives and efforts to intervene in the reported earnings, in explaining the mean-reversion of the extremely high versus low annual earnings.