21세기 미·중·일 안보협력 가능성 : 전망과 대안

Abstract

근자에 들어 미래 동북아 국제관계에 영향을 끼칠 것으로 보이는 지역국가들 간 관계변화가 나타나고 있는데, 특히 21세기 미ㆍ중ㆍ일 삼국의 안보협력 가능성 문제는 비상한 관심을 모으고 있다. "개입 및 확대"는 미국 외교정책의 기조로서 유지될 것으로 보이는데, 여기서 일본의 국제정치적 위상 강화, 북한 핵문제에 대한 다자적 해결, 중국과의 갈등적 협력, 혈맹관계를 탈피하는 보다 동등한 한국과의 동반자 관계 등등 냉전 이후 미국의 극적인 정책변화가 나타났다. 일본의 경우는 국제무대에서 정치군사적 위상을 강화하여 심지어 "no라고 말할수 있는"정도까지 나아가고 있는데, 이는 일본이 그 경제적 능력에 걸맞는 보다 강화된 정치적 지위를 획득해야 한다는 소위 '정상국가론'에 명분적 기반을 두고 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 일본은 1996년 4월 미ㆍ일 안보선언에서 동북아지역의 미국 대리인의 지위를 차지한 것으로 보이며, AWACS, AEGIS, THAAD 등 최첨단 무기체계를 도입함으로써 군사적 능력을 계속 확대시키고 있다. 그러나 중국은 이러한 움직임에 대하여 반발하고 있다. 중국 정부는 냉전 종식 이후 러시아와 화해를 도모하여 국경분쟁을 종식시켰으며, 러시아와의 경제협력 중진을 꾀하고 있다. 바야흐로 '전략적 삼각'의 무게중심이 중국-미국에서 중국-러시아로 이동하고 있는 것이다. 이러한 상황 하에서 중국은 군비경쟁은 아닐지라도 일본을 겨냥한 경쟁적인 군비강화에 돌입하였는데, 이는 미국 이후의 동북아지역 국제관계에 대비하고 미ㆍ일 간의 묵시적 반 중국 동맹을 견제하기 위함으로 사료된다. 따라서 미ㆍ중ㆍ일 간의 안보협력 가능성은 그다지 높지 않다고 할 수 있는데, 이는 비록 진행 중인 미ㆍ러ㆍ일 안보대화와 함께 미ㆍ중ㆍ일 안보대화가 모색되고 있기는 하지만, 미ㆍ중ㆍ일 삼국 간에는 근본적인 정치군사적 갈등이 존재하고 있기 때문이다. 그렇다면 한국의 정책대안은 보다 신중해야 한다. 동북아 지역의 국제정치관계의 불안정성으로 인하여 한국은 현상유지와 현상변경을 동시에 추구해 나아가야 한다. 따라서 "참여 및 균형" 이라는 정책기조가 보다 적합할 것으로 생각되는데, 이는 한국이 진행 중인 국제적 변화를 활용하고 관련국가들 간의 세력균형에서 바람직한 역할을 찾을 수 있다는 점에서 그러하다. '내부의 적'을 극복하고 국민통합을 이룩하며 국제적 도전에 대응하기 위한 건전한 지도력이 요구됨은 물론이다.

There are some changes in the relationship among the countries in the Northeast Asia, which seem to affect the future of the international relations in the region. Especially the probable cooperation among the United States, China and Japan in the 21st century would be one of the most interesting and crucial issues. "Engagement and Enlargement" will continue to be the base of U.S. diplomacy, out of which drastic policy options are conceived in the Post Cold War period; strengthening Japanese international "political" position, multilateral approach to the nuclear problem of North Korea, conflictive cooperation with China, more equal partnership with the Republic of Korea other than blood-alliance, and the like. Japan has been trying to upgrade its politico-military position in international arena, even to the stage of "can say no", the cause is 'a normal state theory', in which Japan should be entitled to get a politically higher position identical with its economic capability. In this context, Japanese government seemed to take over a position of regional manager on behalf of the U.S. at the joint communique in April 1996 and continues to enlarge its military capabilities, adopting AWACS, AEGIS, even THAAD. But China has been reluctant to this change. Chinese government has sought a rapprochement with Russia after the end of the Cold War, and reached to an agreement liquadating the border conflict. In addition, China is trying to promote economic cooperation with Russia. The center of mass of 'the strategic triangle' appears to move from China-U.S. to China-Russia. In this atmosphere, China does not hesitate to enter into a competitive armament, not an arms race, against Japan, in order to prepare a post-U.S. era in the Northeast Asia, and to check a tacit entente between U. S. and Japan. Thus there is the little probability of the three powers' security cooperation. It is because there are fundamental politico-military cleavages among the three, even though a U.S.-Russo-Japanese security dialogue is going on and a U.S-Sino-Japanese security dialogue is being sought. Then policy options for Korea should be more prudent. The growing international turbulence of the Northeast Asia demands status quo and change simultaneously of Korea. So the policy base of "participation and balancing" would be more feasible, in that Korea can take advantage of the ongoing changes and find a desirable role in the balance of the parties concerned. It goes without saying that a sane leadership is needed to overcome an 'internal enemy', to accomplish a solid national integration and to cope with the international challenge in the region.

There are some changes in the relationship among the countries in the Northeast Asia, which seem to affect the future of the international relations in the region. Especially the probable cooperation among the United States, China and Japan in the 21st century would be one of the most interesting and crucial issues. "Engagement and Enlargement" will continue to be the base of U.S. diplomacy, out of which drastic policy options are conceived in the Post Cold War period; strengthening Japanese international "political" position, multilateral approach to the nuclear problem of North Korea, conflictive cooperation with China, more equal partnership with the Republic of Korea other than blood-alliance, and the like. Japan has been trying to upgrade its politico-military position in international arena, even to the stage of "can say no", the cause is 'a normal state theory', in which Japan should be entitled to get a politically higher position identical with its economic capability. In this context, Japanese government seemed to take over a position of regional manager on behalf of the U.S. at the joint communique in April 1996 and continues to enlarge its military capabilities, adopting AWACS, AEGIS, even THAAD. But China has been reluctant to this change. Chinese government has sought a rapprochement with Russia after the end of the Cold War, and reached to an agreement liquadating the border conflict. In addition, China is trying to promote economic cooperation with Russia. The center of mass of 'the strategic triangle' appears to move from China-U.S. to China-Russia. In this atmosphere, China does not hesitate to enter into a competitive armament, not an arms race, against Japan, in order to prepare a post-U.S. era in the Northeast Asia, and to check a tacit entente between U. S. and Japan. Thus there is the little probability of the three powers' security cooperation. It is because there are fundamental politico-military cleavages among the three, even though a U.S.-Russo-Japanese security dialogue is going on and a U.S-Sino-Japanese security dialogue is being sought. Then policy options for Korea should be more prudent. The growing international turbulence of the Northeast Asia demands status quo and change simultaneously of Korea. So the policy base of "participation and balancing" would be more feasible, in that Korea can take advantage of the ongoing changes and find a desirable role in the balance of the parties concerned. It goes without saying that a sane leadership is needed to overcome an 'internal enemy', to accomplish a solid national integration and to cope with the international challenge in the region.