Efficient Bargaining Model: A Dynamic Approach

Abstract

이 논문은 노동조합원수가 전기의 고용수준에 의해 결정될 경우의 노동조합의 동태적 최적화 행동을 분석한다. 이 동태적인 분석에서 나타난 결과를 지금까지 주로 행해진 정태적인 분석에서의 결과와 비교함으로써 정태적인 모형의 한계를 극복하고 보다 현실적인 효율적 협상모형을 모색한다. 특히 정태적인 모형의 문제점인 과잉고용의 문제가 동태적 접근에 의하면 정태적인 모형에서 나타나는 것처럼 크지는 않다는 결과가 도출된다. 그리고 동태적 모형의 결과에 대해서 Robustness와 Time Consistency 문제를 분석한다.

This paper analyzes union's dynamic optimizing behavior when membership changes according to the change of employment level at the previous period, and compares the results with the static case. By using a dynamic model with endogenous membership rule, we can show that the amount of 'overemployment' in the static one period model is overestimated. In addition, the robustness of overemployment result is examined showing that overemployment is not robust and it depends on the union preferences. Finally, the paper analyzes the time consistency problem in the dynamic optimizing process.

This paper analyzes union's dynamic optimizing behavior when membership changes according to the change of employment level at the previous period, and compares the results with the static case. By using a dynamic model with endogenous membership rule, we can show that the amount of 'overemployment' in the static one period model is overestimated. In addition, the robustness of overemployment result is examined showing that overemployment is not robust and it depends on the union preferences. Finally, the paper analyzes the time consistency problem in the dynamic optimizing process.