The Impact of Union Competiton on Entry Deterrence

Abstract

?? 논문은 잠재적인 진입기업의 노동력의 조직화된 경우 기존 독점기업 노동조합의 전략적인 임금수준 선택문제를 분석한다. 기존의 노동조합은 새로운 기업의 진입이 자신의 보수에 미치는 영향을 고려하여 진입을 저지 혹은 허용하는 임금수준을 선택함으로써 전략적 역할을 수행한다. 진입기업의 노동력이 별개의 노동조합으로 조직된 경우, 기존 노동조합의 임금 요구는 진입기업의 노동조합 임금의 비증가함수이며, 진입기업의 기술적 효율성이 높을수록 기존 노동조합의 전략적인 임금 요구는 감소한다. 이는 진입기업의 높은 생산성이 기존 기업 노동조합의 임금상승을 억제하는 동시에 진입저지를 어렵게 함을 의미한다. 결과적으로 진입위협에 대해 노동조합이 진입저지 임금정책을 실시할 경우 기존 기업의 이윤이 증가할 수도 있으며, 진입저지가 실패하여 독점적 지위가 붕괴할 경우에도 기존 기업의 이윤이 높아질 수 있다. 이러한 결과는 노동조합의 전략적인 역할을 고려할 결우 전통적인 진입저지이론은 근본적으로 수정되어야 함을 보여준다.

This paper analyzes the strategic choice of wage level by the union in the incumbent monopoly firm when workforce in potential entrant is unionized. The incumbent union can play a strategic role by choosing wage level to deter or accomodate the entry of new firm according to the payoffs from each strategy. Especially when workforce in potential entrant is separately unionized, incumbent union's wage is nondecreasing with respect to entering union's wage. Moreover, as technology efficiency of entrant increases, wage response curve shifts to the right and incumbent union's strategic wage level is decreasing. This implies higher productivity of entering firm has effect to deter incumbent union's wage increase and to make entery deterrence more difficult. In addition, in some cases, entry threat and resulting incumbent union's entry deterrence wage policy was positive effect on incumbent firm's profit. Moreover, incumbent firm's profit can be higher even after its monopoly position is collapsed under unionization. This result is quite remarkable since it requires fundamental reformulation of traditional entry deterrence theory.

This paper analyzes the strategic choice of wage level by the union in the incumbent monopoly firm when workforce in potential entrant is unionized. The incumbent union can play a strategic role by choosing wage level to deter or accomodate the entry of new firm according to the payoffs from each strategy. Especially when workforce in potential entrant is separately unionized, incumbent union's wage is nondecreasing with respect to entering union's wage. Moreover, as technology efficiency of entrant increases, wage response curve shifts to the right and incumbent union's strategic wage level is decreasing. This implies higher productivity of entering firm has effect to deter incumbent union's wage increase and to make entery deterrence more difficult. In addition, in some cases, entry threat and resulting incumbent union's entry deterrence wage policy was positive effect on incumbent firm's profit. Moreover, incumbent firm's profit can be higher even after its monopoly position is collapsed under unionization. This result is quite remarkable since it requires fundamental reformulation of traditional entry deterrence theory.